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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and
photographic analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch,
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment
of the mission.
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wShuttle Mission STS-60 was launched at 7:10 a.m. local 2/3/94
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91.0 Stummary
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 2 February 1994. The detailed walkdown of
Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the primary flight
elements Or-103 Discovery (18th flight>, ET-61 (LWT 54), and
BI-062 SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle
anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 2 February 1994. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base and no IpRrs were taken.
Although acreage icing on the External Tank was possible due to
an ambient temperature of 44 degrees, winds averaging 9 knots
and lower than expected relative humidity of 79 percent caused
only frost to form on a mostly condensate-free tank. Patches of
frost were visible on the L02 tank barrel section and the upper
part of the LH2 tank.
After the 7:10 a.m. launch on February 3rd, a debris inspection
of Pad 39A was performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials
were found. Damage to the pad overall was minimal. The GH2
vent line was latched on the fifth tooth of the latching
mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract lanyard).
A total of 120 films and videos were analyzed as part of the
post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. No
stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. All T-0
umbilicals operated properly.
On-orbit photographs taken by the flight crew of the External
Tank after separation from the Orbiter revealed no major damage
or lost flight hardware that would have been a safety of flight
concern. The intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout was intact
and no divots were visible. The bipod jack pad closeouts ap-
peared to be intact also. There were no divots in the intertank
acreage foam. TPS eroded/ablated on the. LH2 tank aft dome apex
and manhole covers, which is a normal occurrence.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after
retrieval. Both frustums had a combined total of 21 MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. The cover on the LH frustum upper right
BSM was bent backward to the 90 degree position and the attach
ring had been deformed/fractured by parachute riser entangle-
ment. The HDP #3 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible nut
half. Although launch films showed no debris falling from the
DCS/stud hole at lift off, post. flight disassembly of the
Debris Containment System revealed a retention of only 53
percent. The ordnance fragments may have been lost at water
impact. The HDP #4 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible
nut web and small ordnance fragments.
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A post landing inspection of 0V-103 was conducted after the
landing at KSC. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 106 hits,
o_ which 15 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. The
Orbiter lower surface had a total of 48 hits, of which 4 had a
major dimension of 1-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and
comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar
configuration, both the total number of debris hits and the
number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average.
A greater than usual number of tile damage sites occurred on
the leading edges of the OMS pods and vertical stabilizer.
Eleven of these hits had a major dimension larger than 1-inch.
Depths ranged from 1/8 to 3/4 inches. This type of damage is
usually attributed to impacts from higher density material,
such as ice from the waste water dump. The shim in the EO-2
"salad bowl" was partially debonded and displaced across the
stud hole approximately I/4-inch. No debris was found on the
runway beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a
variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples that were
attributed to SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, natural landing
site products, and paints/primers from various sources. These
residual sampling data do not indicate a single source of
damaging debris as all of these materials have been documented
previously in post-landing sample reports. The residual sample
data also showed no debris trends when compared to previous
mission data.
A total of seven Post Launch Anomalies, but no IFA's, were
observed during the STS-60 mission assessment.
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2 °0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for
launch activities was conducted on 2 February 1994 at 0800
hours. These personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection/evaluation of data, and contributed
to reports contained in this document.
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-60 was launched at 94:034:12:10.000 GMT (7:10 a.m. local)
on 3 February 1994.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 2 February 1994. The detailed walkdown of
Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the primary flight
elements 0V-103 Discovery (18th flight), ET-61 (LWT 54), and
BI-062 SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle
anomalies.
3.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 2 February 1994 from 0245 to 0415 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
44.4 Degrees F
79.2 Percent
8.9 Knots
306 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intact. Due to the prevailing
weather conditions, somewhat greater than usual ice and frost
accumulations were present at the SSME #I and #2 heat shield-
to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared scan revealed no unusual
temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted
heat shields.
3.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the PSTI/Cyclops spot
radiometer ranged from 40 to 47 degrees F. The SRB GEI measured
temperatures ranging from 45 to 48 degrees F. This was the
second flight using reduced GEI instrumentation with only four
case acreage temperature sensors per SRM. All measured tempera-
tures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement.
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FIGURE 1. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
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FIGURE 2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
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The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied
by MTI was 61 degrees F, which was within the required range of
44-86 degrees Fahrenheit.
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3.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 2300 to 0700 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3.
The program predicted ice/frost formation or freezing runoff
condensate (Region III) on the TPS acreage surfaces after
cryoload.
The Ice Team observed no ice accumulations on the L02 tank
ogive. Light frost had formed on the barrel section. There were
no acreage TPS anomalies. Surface temperatures as measured by
the infrared radiometer averaged 35 degrees F on the ogive and
26 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 28 degrees F on the ogive and 25
degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical
ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual vapor, was present on
the ET umbilical carrier plate. The radiometer measured a
surface temperature of 40 degrees F.
There were no LH2 tank acreage TPS anomalies. Light frost, but
no ice, was present on the acreage. Heavier accumulations of
ice/frost had formed along the edges of the PAL ramps, cable
tray ramps, pressurization line ramps, and longerons. The
portable STI/Cyclops measured surface temperatures averaging 27
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 34 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, SURFICE predicted temperatures of 26
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 32 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank.
The bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with
adjacent foam.
A 10-inch long by i/2-inch wide crack in the -Y vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout
interface was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria
and required no IPR.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the LO2 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/
frost fingers on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge
vents were typical. .
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline_bellows and the in-
board side of the feedline straight section_were frost covered.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical purge barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed
on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was
present on the aft pyrotechnic canister closeout bondline
indicating a thermal short. Ice/frost had formed from the
17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug forward
corner to the aft pyro canister closeout. No unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish,
and launch.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were all acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of four OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the L02 feedline support brackets and bellows.
Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the L02 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals, pyro can purge vents,
purge barrier, and LH2 recirculation line bellows/burst discs.
Anomaly 003 documented a crack 10-inches long by I/2-inch wide
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS. The
crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost.
Anomaly 004 documented frost accumulations on various areas of
the L02 and LH2 tank acreage.
3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch (LCC requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP.
No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the GOX vent
hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the GOX vent ducts
Launch Accessories reported a hydraulic leak in the Orbiter
Access Arm retract system. However, the Ice Team found no
indications of a leak at the OAA console on the FSS 175 foot
level or at the OAA hinge on the FSS 195 foot level.
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Pre-launch configuration of bipod jack pad closeouts
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4Light frost, but no ice or significant amounts of condensate,
were present on the External Tank acreage after cryogenic
loading. The frost melted shortly after sunrise. There were no
ice/frost LCC violations prior to launch.
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vSome ice/frost had formed on most of the protuberance to L02
and LH2 tank acreage interfaces. The presence of this ice/frost
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
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A crack, I0 inches long by 1/2 inch wide, appeared in the
forward surface of the -Y ET/SRb cable tray after cryoload. The
crack was not filled with ice or frost and exhibited no offset.
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the
ET/ORB LH2 umbilical. Ice/frost on the plate gap and pyro can
purge vents was typical. Some frost had formed along the LH2
feedline support bracket to acreage interface. No cryogenic
drips or unusual vapors appeared during tanking and stable
replenish.
15
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Ice/frost accumulation on the plate gap and pyro can purge
vents, LH2 recirculation line bellows and burst discs was
typical. Ice/frost had formed Along the LH2 feedline to
acreage interface from the TPS plug to the pyro can closeout.
No cryogenic drips or unusual vapors appeared during tanking
and stable replenish.
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the Mobile Launch Platform, Fixed
Service Structure and Rotating Service Structure was conducted
on 3 February 1994 from Launch + 3 to 4.5 hours.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim
material was intact, but significantly debonded on HDP #i and
#2. There was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of
the south holddown posts. All of the north HDP doghouse blast
covers were in the closed position. The SRB aft skirt purge
lines and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust plume
damage.
A bolt was loose on the E-7 camera pedestal near HDP #4.
A 36 inch long piece of metal hand rail screen material from
the ET intertank access structure was found on the southwest
corner of the MLP deck wrapped around a permanent hand rail.
Impact marks were visible on the deck. A similar piece of
material 24 inches in length was found on the southwest pad
apron.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX
vent arm showed only minor damage.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the fifth tooth of the
latching mechanism, had no loose cables (static retract
lanyard) and appeared to have latched properly with no rebound.
Typical damage to the facility included several loose/detached
panel doors cable tray covers on the FSS and RSS. This type of
damage usually occurs after the vehicle clears the tower and is
not considered a debris threat.
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage.
Debris inspections of the pad acreage, north flame trench,
beach, and areas outside the pad perimeter were performed. No
flight hardware or TPS material was found. Post launch pad
inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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=South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim
material was intact, but significantly debonded on HDP #i and
#2.
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A 36 inch long piece of metal hand rail screen material from
the ET intertank access structure was found on the southwest
corner of the MLP deck wrapped around one of the permanent hand
rail. The screen material came off after the vehicle cleared
the tower.
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J5.0 FILM REVIEW_RDPROBLEMREPORTS
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems
engineers. No In-Flight Anomalies were generated as a result of
the film review. Post flight anomalies are listed in Section 9.
5.1 LAUNCH FILMANDVIDEO S_%RY
A total of 105 films and videos, which included forty-one 16mm
films, twenty-one 35mm films, three 70mm films, and forty
videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have affected the mission.
During SSME ignition, free burning hydrogen was blown south by
prevailing winds and drifted upward to the LH OMS pod. SSME
ignition and gimbal profile appeared normal (OTV 051, 063, 070,
071). Mach diamonds formed in the SSME #2 and #I exhaust plumes
almost simultaneously, which may indicate SSME #2 was somewhat
slow in starting (E-76) . A flash occurred in the SSME plume
during ignition (E-2).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-77).
Surface coating material was lost from base heat shield tiles
outboard of SSME #3 (2 places), near the RH OMS nozzle heat
shield (13 places), and from the aft surface of the ACPS
stinger (I place) (E-17, 19). Tile surface coating material,
approximately I" x 1" in size, appeared near the body flap
hinge area/outer edge and fell aft at 12:09:57.096 GMT (E-18).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces of ice contacted the umbili-
cal cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage
was visible (OTV 009).
A piece of mylar tape from the ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier
(baggie) fell from the inboard corner of the LH2 umbilical past
the RH inboard elevon during SSME ignition (OTV 009, E-6, 17).
A piece of plastic or tape first appeared near the RH SRB and
moved in the direction of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical (OTV 054).
A light colored particle, most likely a piece of ice, was first
visible near the -Y ET/SRB aft strut fairing and fell downward
without contacting the vehicle (E-31).
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No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No
ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from any of the
DCS/stud holes. One piece of RH SRB aft skirt thermal curtain
tape was loose (E-7).
A greater than usual amount of ejecta (throat plug material,
instafoam particles, deck/paint scale) from the RH SRB exhaust
hole crossed the field of view after T-0 (E-7). A thin, rigid,
dark object, most likely deck or paint scale, was ejected
upward out of the RH SRB exhaust hole, moved south, and passed
the east side of the L02 TSM (E-5).
SRB sound suppression water trough cloth parts tags crossed the
field of view after T-0 (E-5, 9).
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and
retracted properly (OTV 049, 050, 063, E-17, E-18) . GUCP
disconnect from the External Tank was nominal (E-33). The GH2
vent line appeared to latch normally (OTV 060, E-41, 42, 50).
There was no excessive slack in the static retract lanyard.
Post launch inspection found the GH2 vent line latched on the
fifth tooth of the latching mechanism.
Numerous debris objects were visible in the SSME plume exiting
the south flame trench after the vehicle cleared the tower
(E-62, 63, 76).
A light colored object, most likely an FRCS thruster paper
cover, first appeared near the base of the vertical stabilizer
and fell aft past SSME #1 (E-213, frame 3466).
Pieces of RCS paper covers were visible passing over the
Orbiter wings (E-59, 213, 222).
Five flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent (E-205,
207, 211, 213, 223, 224).
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to
previous flights (E-213).
Numerous SRB propellant particles fell out of the plume during
ascent (E-213, 220, TV-4A).
ET aft dome charring and exhaust plume recirculation were
typical (TV-13). Numerous pieces of slag fell out of the SRB
plumes before, during, and after separation (TV-4A, TV-21A).
SRB plume tailoff and separation appeared normal (E-208, 212,
220) .
The SRB frustums appeared to separate from the forward skirts
properly. Parachute deployment and reefing appeared normal.
Although dark due to the time of day, splashdown was visible
(E-301, 302).
V
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Surface coating material was lost from base heat shield tiles
outboard of SSME #3 (2 places), near the RH OMS nozzle heat
shield (13 places), and from the aft surface of the ACPS
stinger (i place).
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
Thirty-seven hand held still images and fifteen minutes of
video were obtained by the flight crew of the External Tank
after separation from the Orbiter. All surfaces of the
External Tank were photographed with the exception of the +Y+Z
quadrant. OV-103 was not equipped to carry ET/ORB umbilical
cameras.
No major damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would
have been a safety of flight concern.
The intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout was intact and no
divots were visible. The bipod jack pad closeouts appeared to
be intact. There were no divots in the intertank acreage TPS.
The BSM burn scars on the L02 tank were typical. No anomalies
occurred on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS
antennae, flight door, bipod ramps, LH2 tank acreage, LO2 feed
line, and aft hardpoint.
TPS eroded/ablated on the LH2 tank aft dome apex and manhole
covers, which is a normal occurrence. The aft dome acreage NCFI
was charred, but showed no erosion or divots.
5.3 LANDING FILM ARDVIDEO S_
A total of fourteen videos, six 16mm films, and nine 35mm large
format films were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There
were no anomalies when the landing gear was extended. Touchdown
of the left and right main gear was nominal and almost simul-
taneous.
The drag chute was deployed after breakover, but before the
nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment appeared
nominal. The chute was blown slightly westward (+Y side of the
Orbiter) by prevailing winds.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
Black tiles on the LH OMS pod leading edge exhibited some
damage.
r
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TPS eroded/ablated from the External Tank LH2 aft dome apex and
manhole covers - a normal occurrence. The aft dome acreage NCFI
was charred, but showed no erosion or divots. Five light
colored spots on the LH2 tank acreage near the -Z axis were
areas sanded smooth during ground processing.
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The intertank-to-LH2 tank flange was intact and no divots were
visible. The bipod jack pad closeouts appeared to be intact
also. There were no divots in the intertank acreage TPS.
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v6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 7 February 1994 from 0830
to 1030 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in
good condition.
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had I0 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners. There was virtually no blistering of the Hypalon
paint with the exception of minor localized blistering along
the 395 kick ring. All BSM aero heat shield covers were locked
in the fully opened position (Figure 4).
The RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the systems
tunnel cover and around the ET/SRB attach point. No pins were
missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension. Some foam (PDL) spillage
adhered to the aft field joint closeout near the 270 degree
axis and may have originated from the forward ET/SRB attach
point closeout.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, IEA covers, and stiffener rings
appeared undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon
paint was blistered/missing from the BTA closeouts (Figure 5).
HDP #1 and #2 Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were
seated and appeared to have functioned properly. The HDP #3 DCS
plunger was obstructed by a frangible nut half. Although launch
films showed no debris falling from the DCS/stud hole at lift
off, post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System
revealed a retention of only 53 percent. The ordnance fragments
may have been lost at water impact. The HDP #4 DCS plunger was
obstructed by a frangible nut web and small ordnance fragments.
EPON shim material is no longer bonded to the HDP #3 and #4 aft
skirt structure.
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The RH frustum was missing no TPS, but had i0 MSA-2 debonds
over fasteners. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in
the fully opened position. There was virtually no blistering of
the Hypalon paint.
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RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing TPS.
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB
attach point.
3O OR!GiNAL PAGE
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Some foam (PDL) spillage adhered to the aft field joint
closeout near the 270 degree axis and may have originated from
the forward ET/SRB attach point closeout.
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The HDP #3 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible nut half.
Launch films showed no debris falling from the stud hole at
liftoff. Post flight disassembly of the DCS revealed a reten-
tion of 53 percent.
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6.2 I_ SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had Ii MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners. There was virtually no blistering of the Hypalon
paint with the exception of minor localized blistering along
the 395 ring (Figure 6). All BSM aero heat shield covers had
locked in the fully opened position. However, the upper right
cover was bent backward to the 90 degree position and the
attach ring had been deformed/fractured by parachute riser
entanglement.
=
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB
attach point and on the systems tunnel cover. No pins were
missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, IEA covers, and stiffener rings
appeared undamaged. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition, though MSA-2
was missing from four places on the 1860 ring frame and near
the HDP #7 foot (Figure 7) The largest area of missing TPS
measured 4" x 2". No significant amount of BTA was used on the
aft skirt closeouts. A greater than usual amount of instafoam,
typically applied at the launch pad, was missing from the aft
skirt aft ring. Exposed sections of K5NA were sooted and
showed signs of heating.
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly. EPON shim material is
no longer bonded to the HDP #7 and #8 aft skirt structure.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had a total of ii MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. All BSM aero heatshield cover5 had
locked in the fully opened position, though the upper right
cover attach ring had been bent by parachute riser entanglement
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Preliminary post flight assessment revealed the upper right BSM
aero heat shield cover had opened and locked properly. The
cover was bent back to the 90 degree position. The fracture
plane on the cover attach ring was not sooted and may indicate
the failure occurred late in re-entry or at water splashdown.
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-The LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or
missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were
intact.
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Aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition though
MSA-2 was missing from four places on the 1860 ring frame and
near the HDP #7 foot. No significant amount of BTA was used on
this aft skirt.
39
IM.
J
7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of 0V-103 (Discovery) was
conducted 11-14 February at the Kennedy Space Center on Shuttle
Landing Facility (SLF) runway 15 and in the Orbiter Processing
Facility bay #3. This inspection was performed to identify
debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The
Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 106 hits, of which 15 had a
major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to
SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 44 previous
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23,
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known
debris sources), indicates both the total number of hits and
the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average
(reference Figures 8-11).
The following table breaks down the STS-60 Orbiter debris
damage by area:
HITS > I" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface
Upper surface
Right side
Left side
Right 0MS Pod
Left OMS Pod
4 48
1 28
0 2
0 4
2 7
8 17
TOTALS 15 106
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 48 hits, of
which 4 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. The
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of
ice and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random
sources.
The largest tile damage site measured 4.0" x 1.5" x 0.25" and
was located on the left inboard elevon. The remaining tile
material in the damage site showed no significant signs of
heating, glazing, erosion, etc.
A greater than usual number of tile damage sites occurred on
the leading edges of the OMS pods and vertical stabilizer.
Eleven of these hits had a major dimension larger than 1-inch.
Depths ranged from 1/8 to 3/4 inches. This type of damage is
usually attributed to impacts from higher density material,
such as ice from the waste water dump.
Clusters of hits near the LH2 and L02 ET/ORB umbilicals may be
indicative of impacts from umbilical ice.
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STS-60
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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TOTAL HITS = 48
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ALL DIMENSION9
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STS-60
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
TOTAL HITS = 2
HITS • 1 INCH =
FIGURE
STS-60
zo.DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN INCHES
TOTAL HITS = 4
ITS>lINCH= 0
43
_r
FIGURE 11.
STS-60
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
I" x 0.75" x 0.1"
5 hits; 0 greater than
1-inch in size
1" x 0.5" x 0.25"
1.25" x 1" x 0.125"
17 tile damage sites
on the leading edge
i ncl ud i ng:
3" x i" x 0,125"
2.5" x I" x 0.25"
i" x 0.5" x 0.25"
2" x 2" x 0.5"
3" x I" x 0.125"
2.5" x 0.5" x 0.125:
1.5" x I" x 0.5"
3.5" x 0.75" x 0.75"
V
4 hits; 0 greater than 1-i
3 hits; 0 greater than 1-inch
4 hits; 0 greater than l-inch
TOTAL HITS = 52
HITS > 1 INCH = 11
ALL DIMENSlONg
IN INCHES
4 hits; 0 greater than 1-inch
5" x 1.25" x 0.125" repair missing
from AFRSl aft of FIU thruster
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No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was
identified during the inspection.
White residue/deposits were visible on the RH wing T-seal #9.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels,
tires, or brakes. The tlres were in good condition after a
landing on the KSC runway.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned
properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance reten-
tion shutters were closed. No Significant amounts of foam or
red purge seal adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical near the
4-inch flapper valve. The sh_m in the EO-2 "salad bowl" was
partially debonded and displaced across the stud hole
approximately i/4-inch. No debris was found on the runway
beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities.
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderate hazing with some
streaks. Only a very light haze was present on the other
windows. Surface wipes will be taken from all windows for
laboratory analysis. No other sites on the Orbiter were
identified for chemical analysis sampling. Tile damage on the
window perimeter tiles was typical.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was also typical. The Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets on all three
SSME's were in excellent condition and no material was missing.
Minor fraying occurred at the 7:00 o'clock position on the SSME
#I DMHS blanket. Tiles on the verticai stabilizer "stinger" and
around the drag chute door were intact and undamaged.
V
Runway 15 had been swept/inspected by SLF operations personnel
prior to landing and all potentially damaging debris was
removed.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 15 was performed
immediately after landing. No unexpected flight hardware was
found on the runway. All Orbiter drag chute hardware was
recovered and showed no signs of abnormal operation. No organic
(bird) debris was found on the runway.
The Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the
surface temperatures of several areas on the vehicle (per OMRSD
V09AJ0.095). Twenty-four minutes after landing, the Orbiter
nosecap RCC was 170 degrees Fahrenheit. Twenty-seven minutes
after landing, the RH wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 104
degrees F and panel #17 was 99 degrees F (Figure 12).
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits
and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average
when compared to previous missions (reference Figures 13-14).
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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FIGURE12. STS-60 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS
RECORDED BY THE SHU'R'LE THERMAL IMAGER
v
RCC PANEL 1799
TIME 27 minutes
after landing
RCCPANEL9 104
TIME 27 minutes
after landing
ORBITER:
MISSION:
0V-103 Discovery
STS-60
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
NOSECAP 170
TIME 24 minutes after landing
FIGURE l 3 ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
STS-6 15 80 36 120
STS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 56
S TS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
STS- 14 (4 l-D) 10 44 30 111
ST_17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
S TS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
S TS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
S'1"S-27(51-1) 21 g6 33 141
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111
STS-30 (61-,4) 24 129 34 183
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-29 18 100 23 132
STS-28R 13 60 20 76
STS-34 17 51 18 53
STS-33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS_6 17 61 19 81
STS-31R 13 47 14 63
STS-41 13 64 16 76
STS-38 7 70 8 8i
STS-35 15 132 17 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
S TS-3g 14 217 16 238
STS-40 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
STS-48 14 100 25 182
STS-44 6 74 9 101
STS-45 18 1;='_ 22 172
STS-49 6 55 11 114
STS-50 28 141 45 164
STS-48 11 186 22 236
STS-47 3 48 11 108
STS-52 6 152 16 290
STS-53 11 145 23 240
STS..54 14 80 14 131
STS-56 18 94 36 156
STS-55 10 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 12 106
STS-51 8 100 18 154
STS-58 23 78 26 155
STS-61 7 59 13 120
,aVERAGE 14.4 92.6 21.7 133.4
SIGMA 7.3 44.1 10.6 58.5
i
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
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Or-103 Discovery landed on Kennedy Space Center SLF
runway 33 on ii February 1994
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Overall view of the Orbiter right side
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Overall view of Orbiter left side
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TTile damage on ET/ORB umbilical door leading edge
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Overall view of SSME's and base heat shield. The SSME DMHS
closeout blankets were in excellent condition. The Orbiter
lower surface tiles sustained a total of 48 hits, of which 4
had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater.
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z Tile surface coating material was lost from numerous places
on the base heat shield and RH OMS nozzle heat shield
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
55
OR_C;N/_L PAGE
CC_O_ PHOTOGRAPH
V
mOverall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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The shim in the EO-2 "salad bowl" was partially debonded
and displaced across the stud hole approximately 1/4 inch
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No significant amounts of ET foam or red purge seal adhered to
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical plate near the LH2 4-inch line flapper
valve.
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Orbiter windows #3 and #4 were moderately hazed and some
streaks were present. Damage to window perimeter tiles was
typical.
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8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-103 Discovery
during the STS-60 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy
Space Center. The samples consisted of 16 wipes from Orbiter
windows #1 - #8. The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition
and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves
placing and correlating of particles and residues with respect
to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability.
Debris sample results/analyses are listed by Orbiter location
in the following summaries.
ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM
exhaust, Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS), paints and
primer from various sources, and natural landing site products.
Textile and building insulation fibers were also present. All
of these materials have been previously observed and occurred
only in trace quantities. There was no apparent vehicle damage
related to these residuals.
STS-60 ORGA_ICANALYSIS
The final results of the STS-60 organic analysis are pending.
Documentation will be included in a subsequent report.
NEW FINDINGS
No new findings were noted in these inorganic sample results
(Figure 15). Final results that include the organic analyses
will be evaluated for documentation in a subsequent report.
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9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, seven post
launch anomalies, but no In-Flight Anomalies (IFA), were
observed on the STS-60 mission.
9.1 LAUNCH P/%D/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
i. South HDP shoe EPON shim material was intact, but debonded
on HDP #I and #2.
2. A greater than usual amount of ejecta (throat plug material,
instafoam particles, deck/paint scale) from the RH SRB exhaust
hole crossed the camera field of view after T-0.
9.2 EXTERNAL TANK
i. No items.
9.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
I. The HDP #3 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible nut
half. Although launch films showed no debris falling from the
DCS/stud hole at lift off, post flight disassembly of the
Debris Containment System revealed a retention of only 53
percent. The ordnance fragments may have been lost at water
impact. The HDP #4 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible
nut web and small ordnance fragments.
2. Aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition,
though MSA-2 was missing from four places on the 1860 ring
frame and near the HDP #7 foot. The largest area of missing TPS
measured 4" x 2". No significant amount of BTA was used on the
aft skirt closeouts.
3. A greater than usual amount of instafoam, typically applied
at the launch pad, was missing from the aft skirt aft ring.
Exposed sections of K5NA were sooted and showed signs of
heating.
9.4 ORBITER
i. A greater than usual number of tile damage sites occurred on
the leading edges of the OMS pods and vertical stabilizer.
Eleven of these hits had a major dimension greater than 1-inch.
Depths ranged from 1/8 to 3/4 inches. This type of damage is
usually attributed to impacts from higher density material,
such as ice from the waste water dump.
2. The shim in the EO-2 "salad bowl" was partially debonded and
displaced across the stud hole approximately I/4-inch.
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary
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1.0 Mission Summary
1.1 LAUNCH
Discovery (OV-103) launched on mission STS-60 from Pad A at 12:10:00.010 Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC) on (February 3, 1994) (day 34) as seen on camera E-9. Solid Rocket
Booster (SRB) separation occurred at 12:12:05.111 UTC as seen on camera E-207.
On launch day, 24 videos were screened. Following launch day, 54 films were reviewed. Film
from camera E-222 was not delivered. No potential anomalies were observed during launch.
Detailed test objective (DTO)-0312 (photography of the external tank after separation) was
performed using a handheld Nikon camera with a 300 mm lens and 2x extender. Thirty-seven
frames of the external tank (ET) were acquired by the astronauts using the Nikon camera.
Discovery is not equipped with umbilical well cameras.
1.2 ON ORBIT
ODERACS deploy was supported by calculating the velocity of the spheres as they left the Get-
Away Special (GAS) can. No on orbit anomalies were identified.
1.3 LANDING
Discovery landed on runway 15 at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) (February 11, 1994). Eleven
videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were received. NASA Select, which uses multiple
views real-time, was also received. Right main gear touchdown was at 42:19:19:21.860 UTC
and left main gear touchdown occurred at 42:19:19:22.060 UTC as seen on Camera TV-33.
Nose wheel touchdown occurred at 42:19:19:41.079 UTC as seen from camera TV-33. Wheel
stop was at 42:19:20:11.210 UTC.
Fifteen landing films were received from KSC and screened. Camera EL-8 was not received.
No major anomalies were noted in any of the approach, landing and rollout video views
screened.
The following items were noted during the post-landing walk around: discoloration of thermal
blankets near the front of both OMS pods; TPS erosion on the forward portion of the starboard
OMS pod; a slight fraying of the DMHS at the base of SSME #3; loose material that appeared to
be a sealant was visible around a couple of orifices inside the LO2 umbilical; TPS erosion on the
base heat shield near the starboard OMS nozzle; tile damage on the nose gear starboard door;
TPS damage along the left edge of the right outboard elevon and the underside of the left inboard
elevon; visually noticeable tread wear was noted on both nose gear tires and the inboard tires for
both main gears; discoloration of tiles and thermal blankets near both forward RCS thrusters.
1.4 TIMING ACTIVITIES
All launch videos had timing and film cameras E-I, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8, E-9, E-10,
E-11, E-i2, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-26, E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59,
E-211, E-224, EL-l, EL-2, EL-3, EL-4, EL-6, EL-7, EL-10, EL- 12, EL-15, EL-19 and EL-20
had in-frame alphanumeric timing. These videos and films were used to time specific mission
events during the initial screening. All of the landing videos had timing except cameras KTV-
13L, SLF-North and SLF-South.
A timing discrepancy was discovered in the review of landing film cameras EL-7 and EL- 15.
Film camera EL-7 was found to have a -0.12 second timing offset. Film camera EL- 15 was
found to have a -75.89 second timing offset.
V
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.1 DEBRIS
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Ignition
2.1.l.I LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-76, E-77, OTV-049, OTV-050, OTV-05I)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical disconnect areas
at SSME ignition through liftoff. A thin shiny piece of debris (possibly a tag) was noted from
camera E-18 traveling from the LH2 TSM carrier assembly toward the Orbiter. None of the
debris was observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.1.2 Orange Debris Near LH2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical
(Camera E-6, E-17, OTV-O09)
A single piece of flexible orange-colored debris (possibly baggie material) fell from the lower
right corner of the LH2 umbilical well area at T-2.550 seconds. This debris is similar in shape
and color to the debris seen from camera E-17 at T-I.210 seconds and from camera E-6 at T-
2.095 seconds near the aft end of the body flap and the right inboard elevon. No follow-up
action was requested.
Figure 2.1.1.2 Orange debris near the LH2 umbilical door sill area noted at SSME
startup. This debris is possibly umbilical baggie material.
2.1.1.3 LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Debris
(Cameras E-4, E-5, E-6, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-25, E-31, OTV-O09, 0TV-
054, OTV-063)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical disconnect
areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. Debris was noted to strike the LH2 umbilical door sill.
No apparent damage was observed. No follow-up action was requested.
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2.1.1.4 Flexible Debris Traveling South near Cable Tray
(Cameras E-6, OTV-054)
A small flexible piece of debris was noted traveling south near ET/Orbiter aft attach strut at T-
0.605 seconds MET. The origin could not be determined nor could the debris be observed after
it passed by the electrical cable tray.
Ir
Figure 2.1.1.4 A single orange piece of debris near the right ET/Orbiter aft attach noted
prior to liftoff. This debris traveled from right to left through the field of
view.
V
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2.1.2 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 Debris Near Vertical Stabilizer
(Camera OTV-071)
A single, small, dark piece of debris was first seen near the speed brake attach at the port side of
the vertical stabilizer, rose slightly and then fell aft. The debris did not appear to strike the
vehicle.
Figure 2.1.2.1 Dark debris near the vertical stabilizer noted at liftoff. The debris traveled
in a vertical line above the rudder/speed brake then fell aft. This event
was not observed during the screening of the launch films.
2.1.2.2 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7)
(Cameras E-5, E-8, E-9, E-IO, E-I1, E-15, E-16, E-57)
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB flame
duct area after SRB ignition. None of the debris appeared to travel toward the Orbiter with
significant velocity.
2.1.3 Debris After Liftoff
2.1.3.1 Debris Prior to and During Roll Maneuver
(Cameras E-52, E-54, E-57, E-213, KTV-4A)
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) at liftoff,
throughout the roll maneuver on the launch tracking views. Most of the debris sightings were
probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals.
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2.1.3.2 Debris During Ascent
(Cameras E-207, E-208, E-212, E-218, E-220, E-223)
During ascent, multiple pieces of debris exited the SRB exhaust plume between 65 and 80
seconds MET. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was
requested.
ir
L
Figure 2.1.2.3 Debris during ascent noted along SRB plumes.
2.1.3.3 Debrts Reported by the Crew (Task #10)
The following is a written transcript of the crew debris report provided by the STS-60
Commander to the Mission Control Center Capcom on February 3, 1994.
v
Capcom
Discovery, Houston, we are three minutes to LOS, if you have time now we can take a
debris report, otherwise we could wait until after the burn.
Commander Charles Bolden
Okay, Charlie, we copy. It's going to be very brief. At Mach 8.3, Ken noticed some
white specs going by W6, very small in size. Again at Mach 12.5, the same white specs.
On the lefthand side of the vehicle, I was looking into the sun the whole time and noticed
nothing.
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Capcom
Okay, Charlie, we copy. At Mach 8.3, some small white specs going by W6 and again at
12.5, thc same small white specs and nothing on thc left side.
Commander Charles Bolden
That's affirmative. And the windows right now don't look to be anything abnormal. Just
the standard kind of haze that you get, but it's relatively clean.
Capcom
Okay. Great! We copy that.
2.2 MLP EVENTS
2.2.1 Flares in Hydrogen Ignitors
(Cameras E-3, E-20, E-76)
Two flares were noted at the southwest hydrogen burn ignitor nozzle prior to SSME ignition.
follow up action was requested.
No
Figure 2.2.1 Flare in the southwest hydrogen ignitor during startup.
J
STS-60 Final Report
77 OR!G!NAE PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
VV
2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.2.2 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-Burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-5, E-15, E-17, E-18, E-20, E-62, E-63, E-76, E-77, 0TV-
163, OTV-070, OTV-071)
An orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was seen curling under the body flap prior to
SSME ignition. This event was noted on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.3 TPS Erosion
(Cameras E-17, E-I8, E-19)
TPS erosion was noted on the base heat shield after SSME startup. Significant erosion was
visible near the R2D RCS thruster. TPS erosion was observed on previous missions. No follow-
up action was requested.
%__,.J
Figure 2.2.3 TPS erosion on the right side of the base heat shield during startup.
2.2.4 Flashes in SSME Plumes after SSME Ignition
(Cameras E-2, E-76)
Multiple flashes were noted in the SSME #1 plume prior to lifloff. These flashes in SSME
exhaust plumes were seen on prior missions. No follow-up analysis was requested.
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2.2.5 Rudder/Speed Brake Draining
(Cameras E-52, E-54)
Fluid drained from the rudder/speed brake drain port after liftoff. Draining continued through
tower clear. This event was observed on previous missions.
2.2.6 Loose Thermal Curtain Tape
(Camera E-7)
A piece of loose RSRB thermal curtain tape was noted just after liftoff. This event was observed
on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
Figure 2.2.6 A piece of loose thermal curtain tape noted on the north side of the RSRB.
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2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
2.3.1 Flares in SSME Plume
(Cameras ET-207, KTV-4A, E-205, E-207, E-211, E-213, E-223, E-224)
At least two flares were noted in the SSME plumes during ascent. This event was observed on
previous missions. These flares were timed at 12:10:35.587 and 12:10:37.911 UTC or 35.576
and 37.901 scconds MET respectively.
Figure 2.3.2 Flare in SSME plume noted during ascent.
2.3.2 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Cameras E-213, E-223)
Only slight body flap motion was visible during the time of maximum dynamic pressure (30-90
seconds MET). However, as part of an ongoing study of OV-103 missions, pad camera films E-
17 and E-18 were reviewed for on-pad motion and frequency calculations. The time frame for
the acquired data was during maximum motion which occurred between SSME ignition and
throttle up (-T-3.775 seconds to T-2.775 seconds).
Of the frequency peaks identified during on-pad motion, global rotation was visible on both
sides and torsion was identified on the port side of the flap. The maximum peak-to-peak
deflection was 0.6 inches on the starboard side and 0.8 inches on the port side. These deflection
measurements are similar to those seen on past missions.
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Film from cameras E-205, E-207, E-213 and E-223 were reviewed for body flap motion visible
during ascent. Due to camera defocus and platform jitter during the time of maximum dynamic
pressure, measurements were not taken.
2.3.3 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras E-205, E-207, ET-207)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB separation has
been seen on nearly all previous missions. The sighting of this event is dependent upon launch
inclination angle and cloud cover during ascent. For STS-60, the start of recirculation was observed at
about 91 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 109 seconds MET on camera E-205.
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-60
CAMERA I START (seconds MET) STOP (seconds MET)
ET-207 93 99
E-205" 91 109
E-207 92 101
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION
RECIRCULATION BY MISSION
MISSION
STS-26
STS-27
STS-29
START
MEr 
92
STOP
(s_ MEa_
112
95 ---
92 112
STS-30 95
STS-28 94
STS-34 95
STS-33
STS-32
STS-36
STS-31
STS-41
STS-38
STS-35
STS-37
STS-39
STS-40
STS-43
STS-48
STS-_M
STS-42
STS-45
STS-49
STS-50
STS-46
STS-47
STS-52
STS-53
95
100
93
91
91
94
92
92
92
94
91
95
92
97
93
98
96
92
92
96
94STS-54
100
112
109
103
108
112
110
BEST VIEW
E200
109
E204,E206
INCLIN.
ANGLE
28.5 °
E205 57.0 °
E208 28.45 °
28.85 °
E205
E204
E206
E204,E206
E207
E212107
107 E204
101 E205
110 E200
108 E205
113 E204
111 E205
E205
I10
110
112
105
113
57.0 °
34.3 °
28.45 °
28.5 °
100
62.0 °
E206 28.45 °
E206 28.45 °
rda 28.5 °
28.45 o
E212
E208
ET208
E205
E208
108
E207
E212
28.45 °
57.0 °
39.0 °
28.45 °
57.0 °
28.45 °
57.0 °
57.0 °
28.35 °
28.45 °
28.45 °
57.0 °
28.45 °
57.0 °
28.45 °
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STS-56 93 111 E205 57.0 °
STS -55 94 110 E208 28.45 °
STS-57 94 109 E204 28.5 °
STS-51 94 112 E204 28.5 °
STS-58 92 102 E204 39.0 °
STS-61 93 113 E208 28.5 °
STS-60 92 109 E205 , 57.0 °
NOTE: No re,circulation was observed on STS-40 films due to cloud cover and inclination angle. Intermittent LOV prevented
acquisition of specific stop times for recirculation on STS-27, STS-30 and STS-34. Best view chosen by duration and clarity of
event on films.
2.4 ON ORBIT EVENTS
2.4.1 Onboard Handheld Camera ET Analysis (Task #6)
(STS--60-11-O1 through 37)
STS-60 crew performed DTO-312 acquiring 37 views of the extemal tank (ET) from a single roll
of 35 mm film. No confirmed damage to the external tank thermal protection system (TPS)
acreage was observed. The entire ET was photographed except the +Y axis (right side) which
was viewed at too oblique an angle for analysis. The photographs were taken by Sergei Krikalev
using Nikon F4 camera with a 300 mm lens and a 2x extender (Method 3). The first photograph
was taken 13 minutes and 54 seconds MET while the ET was at a distance of 858 meters from
the Orbiter. The 36th photograph was taken at 24 minutes 39 seconds MET while the Orbiter
was 3,469 meters from the Orbiter. The analysis results were reported to the Mission Evaluation
Room (MER) Manager and to the standard distribution.
The external tank appeared to be in good condition on the handheld pictures. No confirmed
damage was noted. Pieces of white debris were visible in the background on several of the
frames. The white debris is probably frozen hydrogen from the LH2 umbilical.
The ET/Orbiter separation velocity was determined to be 4.0 meters per second which is similar
to that seen on recent missions.
Astronaut Jan Davis provided approximately fifteen minutes of handheld camcorder video of the
ET. Precise tracking of the ET enabled further screening of the ET for anomalies. There is no
timing data on the video. No damage to the external tank was noted from the screening of the
camcorder views.
V
V
V
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Figure 2.4.1 Onboard Handheld Camera Views of the ET
(STS-60-11-06 top and STS-60-11-10 bottom)
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2.4.2 ODERACS
The Photo/TV Project supported the ODERACS deployment on February 9. Analysts calculated
exit velocities of 6 different calibration spheres launched from a Get-Away-Special Can located
in the aft section of the cargo bay. These calculated velocities ranged from 1.53 to 3.34 meters
per second and were used to help radar sites around the world track the spheres. (See the
accompanying table for actual velocities). Follow-up analysis to determine separation angles
between the spheres just after deployment is ongoing.
SEQ.
1
2
3
4
5
DESCR.
polished
stainless steel
sandblasted
stainless steel
DIA.
_inches_
4.0
EXP. VELOC. CALC. VELOC
_meters/sec.) _meters/sec._
3.39 3.34
I 285 IL
polished solid
sminlesssteel II 2.0 ..]l 2.13 II
sandblasted 2.0 1.85
solid stainless
steel
[1 chrome plated Ialuminum
6.0 161U
solid aluminum II
6.0 1.40
-EJECT.TIME
_min:sec)UTC
54:23.674
2.64 54:26.476
1.82 II 54:28.779
1.86 54:31.448
1.55 ]l 54:35.886
1.53 1154:38.422
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Figure 2.4.2 ODERACS Deploy
The above scene is a composite image showing the six calibration spheres as seen from camera C
in the payload bay. This view illustrates the relative position and ejection sequence of the
spheres but is actually composed from six different video frames.
2.5 LANDING EVENTS
2.5.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video (Task #3)
(SLF-North, Camera TV-33__
Camera SLF-North was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The analysis
considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data were
gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. Assumptions were made that the line of sight
of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter y-axis and that any camera motion or vibration
was negligible. Scaling information was determined by using the distance between the main gear
struts. The vertical difference of the projected main gear point for two successive frames was
multiplied by the scaling factor to find the change in height of the main gear over that interval.
The main gear height above the runway was determined by assigning the frame of touchdown a
height of 0 feet, and cumulatively adding the previous frames. These heights were then
regressed with respect to time. The sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The main
gear sink rate was determined to be 1.8 feet per second.
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STS-60 Main Gear Sink Rate from Video
..m
-l-
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(seconds relative to touchdown)
Figure 2.5.1a Graph of fight main gear height versus time prior to touchdown - video
Camera TV-33 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The analysis
considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data were
gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. Scaling information was determined by using
the relative locations of the vertical stabilizer, fight and left main gear, and nose gear on each
image. The y distance between the nose gear and the main gear was then, multiplied by the scale
to find the height of the nose gear. These heights were then regressed with respect to time. The
sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The nose gear sink rate was determined to be
2.6 feet per second.
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STS-60 Nose Gear Sink Rate from Video
3.00
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I
ol.00 -0.90 -0.80 -0.70 -0.60 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 0.00
Time
(seconds relative to touchdown)
Figure 2.5.1b Graph of nose gear height versus time during rollout - video
2.5.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film (Task #3)
(Cameras EL-7, EL-12)
Camera EL-7 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The analysis
considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data were
gathered at a sample rate of 100 frames per second. Assumptions were made that the line of
sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter y-axis and that any camera motion or
vibration was negligible. Scaling information was determined by using the distance between the
main gear struts. The vertical difference of the projected main gear point for two successive
frames was multiplied by the scaling factor to find the change in height of the main gear over thai
interval. The main gear height above the runway was determined by assigning the frame of
touchdown a height of 0 feet, and cumulatively adding the previous frames. These heights were
then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The main
gear sink rate was determined to be 2.3 feet per second.
V
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STS-60 Main Gear Sink Rate from Film
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(seconds relative to touchdown)
Figure 2.5.2a Graph of right main gear height versus time prior to touchdown - film
Camera EL- 12 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The analysis
considered approximately 0.7 seconds of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data were
gathered at a sample rate of 50 frames per second. Scaling information was determined by using
the relative locations of the vertical stabilizer, right and left main gear, and nose gear on each
image. The effects of camera tracking was corrected by utilizing a runway reference point. The
vertical difference of the projected nose gear point for two successive frames was multiplied by
the scaling factor to find the change in height of the nose gear over that interval. The nose gear
height above the runway was determined by assigning the frame of touchdown a height of 0 feet,
and cumulatively adding the previous frames. These heights were then regressed with respect to
time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The nose gear sink rate was determined
to be 3.2 feet per second.
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STS-60 Nose Gear Sink Rate from Film
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Figure 2.5.2b
2.5.3
Graph of nose gear height versus time during rollout - film
Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
(Cameras EL-l, EL-2, EL-3, EL-4, EL-5, EL-7, EL-9, EL-IO, EL-12, EL-15, EL-
19, EL-20, KTV-SL, KTV-6L, KTV-11L, KTV-15L, KTV-16L, KTV-33L, SLF-
North, SLF-South )
The deployment of the drag chute appeared as expected. All drag chute event times were
obtained from camera EL-10. Drag chute initiation was noted at 42:19:19:32.448 IYTC. Pilot
chute inflation was noted at 42:19:19:33.393 UTC. Bag release was noted at 42:19:19:33.122
UTC. Drag chute inflation in the reefed configuration was noted at 42:19:19:35.086 UTC. Drag
chute inflation in the disreefed configuration was noted at 42:19:19:38.453 UTC. Chute release
was noted at 042:19:19:54.885 UTC.
The landing of Discovery at the end of mission STS-60 marked the twelfth deployment of the
Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared as ex .pected. Standard analysis of
the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using the views from the film camera
EL-7. This analysis is used to support the improvement of the aerodynamic math models
currently in use. The maximum horizontal chute deflection within the analyzed interval was
approximately 6.8 degrees. Figure 2.5.3 presents the measured heading angle versus time.
V
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Figure 2.5.3 Graph of measured drag chute heading angle versus time during rollout
2.6 OTHER NORMAL EVENTS
Other normal events observed include: ice debris and vapor from the ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnects at SSME startup through liftoff; frost on the ET GOX vent louvers; slight motion of
the both inboard and right outboard elevons at SSME startup through liftoff; ice and vapor from
the ground umbilical carrier plate (GUCP) during SSME startup and GH2 vent arm retraction;
debris in the exhaust cloud at the pad after liftoff; RCS paper debris prior to and after liftoff; ET
aft dome outgassing and vapor from the SRB stiffener tings after liftoff; charting of the ET aft
dome during ascent; debris in the SSME exhaust plume from liftoff through the roll maneuver;
flares in the SSME exhaust plume after the roll maneuver; expansion waves; condensation
around the SLV during ascent; linear optical distortions; dark puffs in SRB exhaust prior to SRB
separation; SRB plume brightening; slag debris in the SRB exhaust plume during and after SRB
separation. Normal events related to the pad are fixed service structure (FSS) deluge water spray
activation; and mobile launch platform (MLP) water dump activation.
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February 23, 1994
me INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-60, the eighteenth
flight of the Orbiter Discovery occurred on February 3, 1994, at
approximately 6:10 A.M. Central Standard Time from Launch
Complex 39A (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Extensive photographic and video coverage exists and has been
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard the vehicle, and
uprange and downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-60 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
I. Holddown post blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
There was one special test objective for this mission:
i. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation.
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-three of fifty-four requested
cameras as well as video from all twenty-three requested
cameras. The following table illustrates the camera data
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received at MSFC for STS-60.
Camera data received at MSFC
for STS-60
MLP
FSS
Perimeter
Tracking
Onboard
16mm 35ram 70mm Video
22 0 0 3
7 0 0 3
3 3 0 6
0 15 0 11
2 1 0 0
Totals 34 19 0 23
Total number of films and videos received: 76
\
r.
• ?
__.-'.
. , )
..r
An individual motion picture camera assessment is provided
as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments of the
video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
The films were generally dark. The dark exposures were a
result of the launch time, which occurred at the start of the
launch window, during sunrise. The launch coverage was of lower
quality than usual due to the dark exposure. No film was
received from camera E-222 due to a mechanical failure of the
camera.
b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
Each SRB forward skirt contained a camera to record the
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly and
recorded data through water impact. Due to the lack of light,
these cameras provided poor quality coverage. A 35mm hand-held
camera was used to record film for evaluating the ET TPS
integrity after ET separation. Thirty-seven excellent frames of
the external tank were recorded.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
.
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falling as the vehicle lifts off, debris north of MLP ejected
from SRB blast holes, debris induced streaks in the SSME plume,
ice falling from the 17 inch disconnects and umbilicals, and
debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, which
consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detection paper and
purge barrier material. Body flap and inboard right elevon
motions were noted during ascent. Venting from the speed brake
was noted during ascent. A loose piece of thermal curtain tape
was observed at liftoff on the right SRB as shown in figure i.
A large amount of free burning hydrogen was visible during
the SSME start transient as shown in figure 2. The behavior and
location of this burning are typical of that seen previously.
However, the larger visible amount may be due to the dark
lighting conditions.
b. Glowing Debris from SRM Plume
Figure 3 is a film frame from camera E-220 showing glowing
debris ejected from the SRMplume. Several pieces of glowing
debris were noted during ascent. This debris is generally more
visible during dark sky conditions due to the stronger contrast.
c. Main Parachute Crossing
One of the three main parachutes on the right SRB crossed
between the other two and remained there until water impact.
This event occurred after the main parachutes had fully
deployed.
d. External Tank TPS Divots
Several TPS divots were along the - z axis of the tank.
The divots were in a line and may be indicitive of a debris
impact. These divots are typical of previous observations.
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
34:12:10:00.008
34:12:10:00.008
34:12:10:00.009
too dark to determine
t
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
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to be approximately 33 inches. Figure 4 is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. A positive horizontal displacement
represents motion in the -z direction. These data were derived
from video camera OTV-161.
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-60 was determined to be
34:12:12:05.13 UTC as recorded by camera E-205.
V
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Figure i.
Loose Piece of Thermal Curtain Tape
k_w
Figure 2.
Free Burning Hydrogen at SSME Ignition
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Figure 3.
Glowing Debris Particles Being Ejected from SRB Plume
i00
Lv
0 0
E
n
cl. E
0I-- ©
!LLI (_
F--(/)
C
0
0 0
0
N. 0_
•_. -I_
0
' I ' I t -" I * I
0
d
i ................. J........... .L. __ u L .... L .............. _ --
0 0 0 0
d d d d
0
C_l
0
0
0
!
I-
0
>
00
0
o
CD
00
0
!
0
0 _
d
!
se4oul
IOl Figure 4
QV
k_j
w
Appendix C. Rockwell Photographic Analysis Summary
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ROCKWELL ENGINEERING PHOTOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT FOR STS-60
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to
determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) providing this
coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39A Fixed Service Structure (FSS), Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and uprange and downrange tracking
sites for the STS-60 launch conducted on February 3, 1994, at 4:10 a.m. PST/GMT
034:12:10:00.000 from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on February
11, 1994 at KSC at 11:19 a.m. PST/GMT042:19:19:22. Rockwell received launch films
from 81 cameras (57 cine, 24 video) and-landing films from 27 cameras (15 cine, 12
video) to support the STS-60 photographic evaluation effort. Two films, E-222 and EL8
were not available due to camera malfunction.
Overall, the films showed STS-60 to be a clean t_ght. Several pieces of ice from the
ET/orbiter umbilical were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to the Orbiter
Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual condensation and water
vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB stiffener tings and dissipated after the
completion of the roll maneuver. Charring of the ET aft dome, recirculation and
brightening of the SRB plumes were normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and
SRB separation also appeared to be normal.
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge water was
activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were activated at approximately 1
second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. All blast deflection shields dosed
prior to direct SRB exhaust plume impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and
retracted as designed. The ET GH 2 vent line carder dropped normally and latched
securely with a slight rebound. No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH 2
umbilical hydrogen dispersal system hardware.
STS-60 was the twentieth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB holddown
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). No holddown post hangups were
observed.
No major or significant events were observed or identified. Events noted by the Rockwell
film/video users during the review and analysis of the STS-60 photographic items are summarized
in the following comments. There events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight.
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lo Two flares were noted in the southwest hydrogen bum-off system nozzle just prior
to SSME ignition on cameras E-3, E-20 and E-76. This may indicate the presence
of excess hydrogen. No follow-up action is planned.
.+ On cameras OTV-163, OTV-170, OTV-071, E-2, E-3, E-5, E-15, E-17, E-18, E-
20, E-52, E-76 and E-77, orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen
drifting from beneath the SSME'S upward to the left OMS pod just prior to ignition.
This vapor has been observed on previous flights and no follow-on work is
scheduled .....
o On cameras E-19 and E-20, a white line was noted at the base of SSME #2 inside
the Dome Mounted Heat Shield from ignition through liftoff. F'flms from previous
missions (STS-61 and STS-56) were compared and the white line was visible on
STS-56. A review of this event with the RI/DNY propulsion engineers concluded
the white circular line was frost/ice buildup and was corroborated by the JSC and
KSC film analysis teams. No further follow-up action is planned.
.
Flashes were observed in the SSME #1 plume at SSME ignition (cameras E-2 and
E-76). Flashes in the SSME plumes have been seen on previous missions_ No
follow-up action is planned.
, A piece of light colored debris was seen falling past the _ end of the body _d
the fight inboard elevon during SSME ignition on cameras OTV-009, E-6 and E-17,
This debris was probably mylar tape from the ET/Orbiter umbilical purge barrier.
No follow-up action is planned.
.
On cameras E-18, a thin metallic - looking piece of debris (possibly a tag) was noted
near the body flap hinge area outer edge. The debris did not appear to strike the
vehicle. No follow-up action is planned.
.
On cameras OTV-009, OTV-054, OTV-063, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-
18, E-25 and E-31, normal ice debris was seen falling from the LI-I2 and LO2
ET/Orbiter umbilical disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. Several of
these particles contacted the LH2 umbilical sill, but no damage was detected. No
follow-up action is planned.
. A piece of loose thermal curtain tape was noted on the fight SRB just after liftoff on
camera E-7. No follow-up action is planned.
.
On camera E-54, fluid (water) was observed draining from the rudder speed brake
drain port from liftoff through tower clear. This event has been noted on previous
missions. No follow-up action is planned.
10. On cameras E-205, E-207, E-211, E-213, E-223 and E-224, four flares were
W
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11.
12.
13.
observed in the SSME plumes during ascent.
missions. No follow-up action is planned.
Numerous pieces of light colored debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch
Vehicle and also exiting the SRB exhaust plume during ascent and prior to SRB
separation (Cameras E-207, E208, E212, E213 and E220). This debris was
probably RCS paper, ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals or SRB propellant particles.
This event has been noted on previous missions. No follow-up action is planned.
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Flares have been noted on previous
The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed on
STS-60. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for information
only:
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post area
and MLP
• Charring of the ET aft dome
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff
• RCS Paper debris
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gasses at the aft end of
the SLV prior to SRB separation
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME
start-up
• Twang motion
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure
(MAX-Q) region which appeared to have an amplitude and
frequency similar to those of previous missions
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or
ambient meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during
ascent
• Slag in SRB plume after separation
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up
Camera E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010
requires an analysis of hunch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent clearance
separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET umbilical
structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety.
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances between the left
SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films showed nominal
launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies were observed for the SRB
body trajectory.
14. Cameras E7-16-OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.020 requires an
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analysisof filmdataofSRM nozzledm%ng liftoffto ve__fynozzleto holddow_ post
driftclearance.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No anomalies were
observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive clearances between the SRB
nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
15. The landing of STS-60 occurred on Runway 15 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility.
Good video and film coverage were obtained and no anomalous events were
observed. The flight marked the thirteenth use of the orbiter drag chute. The drag
parachute system performed as expected. All sequenced events occurred as
expected and no hardware anomalies were observed.
Any questions concerning this report should be directed to the undersigned.
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